Consciousness: The Hard Problem

Neuroscience has made remarkable strides in mapping which brain regions underpin perception and movement.

神經科學在描繪哪些腦區支撐感知與運動方面取得了顯著進展。

Yet explaining why any of this activity is accompanied by subjective experience remains elusive.

然而，要解釋為什麼這些活動會伴隨著主觀經驗，仍然難以捉摸。

Philosophers refer to this conundrum as the hard problem of consciousness.

哲學家把這個難題稱為意識的「困難問題」。

We can describe how light stimulates the retina without explaining what it feels like to see red.

我們可以描述光如何刺激視網膜，卻無法解釋看到紅色是什麼感覺。

Some theorists maintain that consciousness will eventually be accounted for in purely physical terms.

一些理論家堅持認為，意識終將能夠純粹用物理術語來解釋。

Others suspect that our current conceptual framework is fundamentally ill-equipped for the task.

另一些人則懷疑，我們目前的概念架構從根本上就不足以勝任這項任務。

The question has acquired fresh urgency with the advent of increasingly sophisticated machines.

隨著日益精密的機器出現，這個問題有了新的急迫性。

If a system behaves intelligently, it is far from obvious whether anyone is experiencing anything.

如果一個系統表現得很聰明，那麼是否有誰在體驗著什麼，遠非顯而易見。

For now, the inner life of minds other than our own remains stubbornly inaccessible.

目前，除了我們自身之外的其他心靈的內在生活，依然頑固地無從探知。