Consciousness: The Hard Problem

Neuroscience has made remarkable strides in mapping which brain regions underpin perception and movement.

神经科学在绘制哪些脑区支撑感知和运动方面取得了显著进展。

Yet explaining why any of this activity is accompanied by subjective experience remains elusive.

然而，要解释为什么这些活动会伴随着主观体验，仍然难以捉摸。

Philosophers refer to this conundrum as the hard problem of consciousness.

哲学家把这一难题称为意识的“困难问题”。

We can describe how light stimulates the retina without explaining what it feels like to see red.

我们可以描述光如何刺激视网膜，却无法解释看到红色是什么感觉。

Some theorists maintain that consciousness will eventually be accounted for in purely physical terms.

一些理论家坚持认为，意识终将能够纯粹用物理术语来解释。

Others suspect that our current conceptual framework is fundamentally ill-equipped for the task.

另一些人则怀疑，我们目前的概念框架从根本上就不足以胜任这项任务。

The question has acquired fresh urgency with the advent of increasingly sophisticated machines.

随着日益精密的机器出现，这个问题有了新的紧迫性。

If a system behaves intelligently, it is far from obvious whether anyone is experiencing anything.

如果一个系统表现得很智能，那么是否有谁在体验着什么，远非显而易见。

For now, the inner life of minds other than our own remains stubbornly inaccessible.

目前，除我们自身之外的其他心灵的内在生活，依然顽固地无从探知。